(Intro by Tom Cooper)

Hello everybody!

Still busy with private affairs and ‘other work’, so not much to add to what Don has collected and prepared over the last week.

…with, perhaps, one exception…

You know it by now: Colonel Yurii Ihnat, the Head of the Public Relation Service of the Ukrainian Air Force & Air Defence Force (PSZSU; I’m usually shortening this further to ‘PSU’) has admitted it publicly: the service did not shot down even one from six Russian ballistic missiles fired at Kyiv during the night from 3 to 4 July.

Can’t but wonder about all those ‘still wondering’ why’… as if that would be so extremely hard to figure out…

But OK, here you have it, once again: principal reason is what I’ve mentioned repeatedly since February: lack of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) - especially FIM-104 Patriot (for PAC-2/3 SAM-systems) and Aster 30 Block 1/1NT (for SAMP-T SAM-systems). Ukraine’s stocks of SAMs were critically low already back in February. Indeed, the PSU run out of Asters by the end of March. We can all safely bet our annual income the situation in this regards didn’t get better ever since.

….nor is going to get better any time soon (simply because the production was not ramped-up on time, which is a process taking two-three years, and both the US- and European-stocks are meanwhile ‘too low for purposes of self-defence… plus that of holy Israel, of course’).

Additionally, and that’s also something observed repeatedly at least since June-July the last year, the Russians are getting ever better in mapping the PSU’s air defence network, and then coordinating their missile- with their strikes by attack UAVs. Means: they ‘pull the PSU by the nose’ (busy it with attack UAVs, nowadays from multiple different directions), then ‘hit it in the guts’ (strike with ballistic- and/or cruise missiles).

Is the only logical result of both official Kyiv and its ‘western Allies’, ‘doing something’ for three (plus) years, ‘modelling the outcome’ (preferably one where Russia does not get defeated, instead of developing strategy how to defeat Russia, work-up the industry and then arm Ukraine ‘to the teeth’… and thus offering the Russians ‘all the time of the World’ to learn their lessons.

…because…sigh… well, you know the reasons by now: ‘what if we lose our business connections to Pudding?’ - and/or (though the most idiotic excuse of all): ‘what if Russia is defeated and then falls apart’…?

How good, they’ve all spent three years diligently working on developing one of most sophisticated and strongest air defence systems for Kyiv… and are now neck-deep into constructing arms factories all over Ukraine.

…if I try stop rolling over my eyes, I’m going to fall off my chair. Thus, better to hand over to Don.

***

Kursk/Sumy

Russian drones attack the trenches 1500 meters east of Tyotkino, then Russian infantry clear them out. The Ukrainian defenders did not observe or fire on the approaching Russian infantry, which was suicidal. 500 meters away, Ukrainian drones attack advancing Russian infantry.

A Russian airstrike on the woods near Khotin. This airstrike is 2300 meters further north. Russian drones on patrol near Korchakivka find sensors and logistical vehicles.

On June 30, a strike on a command post in Korenevo killed General Gudkov. Seven other officers were killed, four were missing and nine were wounded. Gudkov may have revealed his position with an insecure radio call. Ukraine had been tracking his movements across Russia and the May 30 attack in Vladivostok was probably an assassination attempt. Ukraine’s ability to track him speaks to their collection capabilities and Russia’s failure to protect their information. The commander of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, that killed and beheaded Ukrainian prisoners, was also killed.

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Vovchansk

Ten kilometers north of Vovchansk, on the Russian side of the border, a chemical plant was hit by a drone.

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Milove

The Russians came across the border at Milove and Stroivka, advancing up to three kilometers at both locations.

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Kupiansk

Russia shells Ukrainian positions north and south of Kindrashivka. Russia built a simple bridge over the Oskil river by Dvorichna before a drone destroyed it.

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Terny

In a conventional rotation of personnel the relieving force meets the retiring force at the position so there is constant coverage. Ukrainian troops must have noticed that at one location, the retiring force left before the relieving force arrived, and that they left behind a machine gun with no one around. So the Ukrainians took it.

***

Siversk

Some graphic images of drones attacking Russian infantry, then a drone controlled by radio communication tries to attack a vehicle inside a building in Lysychansk 15 km away, followed by a drone with fiber optic cable attacking that same vehicle.

Russians trying to advance south of the quarry are harrassed by drones and artillery.

***

Toretsk

For those who might have not noticed it by now: check the map below. As should be obvious, the Russians - in close cooperation with Syrsky & Buddies in Kyiv - are meanwhile on the best way of creating a ‘super cauldron’ in the Kostiantynivka area. Wouldn’t it be for the ZSU almost certainly losing lots of troops and equipment in the process of extracting out of it, it would be ‘funny to watch’…

A Russian casualty is evacuated on motorcycle by Dyliivka. Ukrainian positions are hit by Dyliivka and the Russians advanced 1500 meters.

Russians moving north from Novoolenivka are attacked by drones. Two Geran/Shahed drones hit houses in Yablunivka. Russian drone attacks in the Yablunivka area have been intense.

A Russian ammo dump was found in Khartsyzk, 60 km from the front. A Russian drone is intercepted west of Kostiantynivka. A drone broke the track of an M113, immobilizing it.

Artillery from the 28th Brigade targets Russian infantry. The 28th Brigade infantry have excellent defensive positions with overhead protection on elevated terrain overlooking a canal and they’ve held these positions for over two years. While they held their ground, the Russian push through Toretsk on their immediate right was a threat to force them from their excellent positions for a while. Then the Russian advances west of Kostiantynivka 26 km away became a threat. Now the Russian attacks towards Dyliivka are making it difficult to sustain their defensive line while threatened on their right flank.

A 28th Brigade M109 155 mm self-propelled gun has a range of 24 km and is probably located southeast of Kostiantynivka about 10-15 km from the front lines. There are very few enemy vehicles in range. The Russians used their tanks like artillery from 14 km away. The gun crew also hasn’t conducted counter battery fire against enemy artillery in a while so most of their targets are Russian infantry in small groups.

A towed artillery piece would be stationary in a defensive position but the self-propelled gun is in a pit deep enough so the top of the turret is just below ground. It moves a few meters forward to fire and then returns to the deeper part of the pit when its fire mission is complete. An overhead scaffold camouflage net is built on top to provide cover and concealment from drones. The front of the position has a ramp that enables the gun to back into the pit and the entrance to the pit is protected by two nets that open horizontally and vertically.

The ammo is stored in a different pit several meters away and connected by a tunnel that bends at a 90 degree angle to somewhat reduce any blast from one pit from reaching the other pit. The living quarters is a safe but close distance away and is fully underground and has overhead scaffolding with a tarp and dirt for protection from enemy attacks and rain. The commander receives targeting information in this location. Once he calculates the direction and elevation of the gun and how many powder charges are needed, he relays the information by radio to the chief of the gun crew.

***

A 35 minute video from six months ago follows a Azov drone team that was operating Vampire (Baba Yaga) drones. It shows how difficult it is to supply the front line in the presence of enemy reconnaissance drones. With the Russian advances west of Kostiantynivka it is now much harder because there are fewer places to drive.

They depart in the evening twilight because it is harder to be seen with drone visual spectrum optics and it is not the optimal temperature for thermal optics. Even when not under attack, bomb craters in the dark can destroy a car, or shrapnel from previously exploded bombs can flatten a tire. If it’s far enough from the front line you can change the tire. If it’s too close there isn’t enough time to change a tire and you have to keep driving or abandon the car.

When word arrives that a Russian reconnaissance drone is in the area, they turn around and find a secure location to hide. When they are told that the recon drone departed, they resume the mission. Unloading supplies has to be done quickly. They combined supply drops to other positions with drone team rotations to minimize the number of logistical runs.

Kamikaze drones are deployed on one-way missions. The Vampire drones return and their batteries need to be recharged. Front line generators that the drone teams use to power their position are not big enough to recharge Vampire drone batteries so batteries are charged at deployment locations behind the forward drone teams.

The basement position of the drone team is 1500 meters from the front. They could hear the artillery shells 3-4 seconds before they landed. The KAB glide bombs sounded like a low-flying jet.

If a drone loses its signal and crashes close to the front line the drone team tries to recover it since it costs at least $10,000. They carry 10-22 30 round magazines for their rifles. Their living/operating quarters are in a different location from the munitions in case the munitions location was hit. Moving from the quarters to the munitions to the launch point is a high risk action due to enemy drone surveillance.

The drone team cannot conduct operations without mechanical and human communication. This was six months ago, but they reported trying to conduct operations without Starlink and found it difficult. They also rely on targeting information from their commanders that provide them with a coordinate and an image of the target. And since they were not using fiber optic cable, they are sometimes hit by friendly EW fire when fellow Ukrainian troops turn on a jammer to block Russian drones that use radio waves but also block friendly drones that use radio signals.

Turning jammers off to conduct offensive operations but leave you vulnerable defensively is an issue for both sides and is fought on an increasing number of wavelengths. Fiber optic cables bypass that issue with the trade off of cables breaking in a forest environment or other terrain and limiting the size of a warhead because of the weight of the cable.

One mission they had was dropping razor wire in the road, and when Russians moved the wire, attached munitions would explode. This was particularly effective against Russian motorcycle assaults.

They depart on the return trip during morning twilight, which provides some small amount of protection from enemy surveillance drones. They see another vehicle with its headlights on, and not just headlights but high beams and fog lights on, as well. At first, the driver wonders if it is a civilian but then realizes it was just Carl, someone from his unit. He used several words to describe Carl: Immortal, idiot, dumbass, deadbeat, and f-ed in the head.

***

(…to be continued…)

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