As promised, I would like to get back to different of your questions, adding additional details about the latest Indo-Pakistani War that became known over the last few days. That said, I think the following is likely to become very interesting for those following our coverage of the War in Ukraine, too.

For the start, ‘usual disclaimer’ - especially for those new to this blog: please, be so kind and read the feature In own Matter: while certainly appearing as ‘selfish and brazen self-advertising’ to many, it’s explaining what am I doing (indeed: what is every of us four posting on this blog doing), and how, and is posted to help you understand how do we come to our conclusions. If you do not like this way of working, then feel free to recommend me some other: as long as done in constructive fashion, ’I’m all ear’.

Ah yes, and: why the title ‘Fire & Smoke’?

It’s not just about the ‘fog of war’, but in a certain earlier conflict (readers of certain of my books know which; here I’m not going into that topic), there was lots of reporting about ‘fire and smoke’, and the use of the same as ‘evidence of success’.

Sorry but, as not only the studies of the conflict in question, but lots of others have shown. ‘fire and smoke’ are only evidence for fire and smoke. Nothing else.

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Q: My blood is boiling when I see you using terminology like ‘Pakistan administered Kashmir’…

I’m not only researching India-Pakistan conflict, but dozens of others. Therefore, had to apply a ‘uniform’ approach to issues of this kind, right from the start of my publishing activity. As anybody (seriously) following my work to any length knows, in cases of this kind I’m using ‘neutral’ descriptions. Sure, both official Islamabad and New Delhi have their own descriptions, but: pending any kind of ‘final solution’ for this issue, to me, ‘India-administered (Jammu &) Kashmir’ (IAJK) and ‘Pakistan-administered (Jammu &) Kashmir’ (PAJK) appear the most neutral and the least offensive descriptions of matters of fact.

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Q: (edited for easier understanding)…neutral Indian military experts (have) analysed the reality despite India’s success as these mentioned and what you mentioned. They clarified that India also faced problems that you did not mention, such as the electronic attacks that disrupted electronic systems and the power outage for 500 million Indians that have not returned until this hour, in addition to the loss of 4 Rafale aircraft. A fourth plane was shot down and India is keeping it a secret, in addition to Mirage 2000, MiG 29, Sukhoi 30, Jaguar, and an early warning aircraft belonging to the Indian Navy, in addition to the destruction of 12 military installations of the Indian forces in the Indian part of Kashmir. Others mentioned by these independent and neutral Indian analysts and other things that were not mentioned, including the destruction of an S-400 battery in one of the bases by a Chinese HD-1A missile, in addition to 3 batteries of the Indian Akash air defense system in the Indian part of Kashmir.

You’re touching a number of issues in a single go. Thus, have to break them down depending on topic.

Power-outages in India: AFAIK, power-outages were reported in much of western Kashmir (approximately from Srinagar in the north of Jammu in the south), in the Pathankot and Amritsar areas. To the best of my knowledge, it remains unclear whether these were a result of something like official (Indian) decision to darken the area, by any kind of Pakistan’s offensive operation (like strikes on local power plants or power network), or electronic warfare.

Number of IAF losses: actually, the figure (indeed: a ‘break-down per type’) I’ve heard from two different contacts in India is ‘higher than 4’ (just like the figure for PAF losses is ‘much higher’ than Islamabad’s official ‘0’). However, this was not officially confirmed, and I’m not free to talk about that figure, so lets disregard it.

Point is this: that figure included no ‘Jaguar’, and definitely no ‘early warning aircraft belonging to the Indian Navy’. Actually, even official Islamabad claimed no (SEPECAT/HAL) ‘Jaguar’ and no (Boeing) ‘P-8I Poseidon’: it merely reported tracking one P-8I – as this made a pass close by the coast or one of warships of the Pakistan Navy, on 6 May. Islamabad then released a FLIR-video showing the jet flying between clouds, but, AFAIK, did not claim it as shot down.

…and, well, ‘tracking an aircraft’ is not the same like shooting it down.

Of course, you are free to post links to the neutral Indian military experts confirming any such claims, and I’ll take a careful look.

Destruction of 12 military installations of the Indian forces in the Indian part of Kashmir: here one needs to start with definition of ‘destruction’. For me, ‘destruction’ of a military facility stands for ‘rendering the facility in question useless from military point of view’. For its large-scale physical destruction.

To the best of my knowledge, and with one exception (see the list below) there’s simply no evidence Pakistan did manage to seriously hit even one Indian military facility. Foremost: official Islamabad released no evidence whatsoever for even one of its claims (and mind: photos of ‘kill markings’ applied on PAF aircraft are evidence for nothing at all, except that the ground crew used paint and brush/air-pistol to apply a kill marking): if any kind of evidence is available, then from the Indian social media.

While there is no doubt that Pakistan did target a large number of Indian military facilities, that Pakistan also hit several of these – or that they were hit by the wreckage of Pakistani attack-UAVs and/or rocket artillery shot down by Indian air defences-, or the wreckage of missiles fired by Indian air defences – there is no evidence for ‘destruction’ of even one of India’s military facility. Few specific cases based on what is spread in the Pakistani social media:

- Srinagar AB (housing one IAF MiG-29UPG-squadron, one Tejas-squadron, and one helicopter squadron): ‘fire & smoke’ were reported from this area two times (there are two videos showing a column of smoke), but there is not a single photo or video showing what exactly was burning there. The IAF continued operating from here for the duration of the conflict and after. Conclusion: this air base was certainly not ‘destroyed’.

- Pathankot AB (housing one IAF AH-64-squadron): the area was hit once, as confirmed by a resulting column of smoke. Pakistan did not provide any kind of evidence of damage caused, and the IAF is known to have continued operations from Pathankot AB throughout the conflict (and after). Conclusion: this air base was certainly not ‘destroyed’.

- Rajouri ammunition depot: a video showing ‘fire & smoke’ from the area of this depot was released (in the Indian social media), but there is no trace of major conflagration as would result from an actual hit on a facility of this kind. Conclusion: this ammo depot was certainly not ‘destroyed’ (and even if: this is no ‘major Indian military facility’).

- Amritsar (whether the local forward operating base of the IAF, any other military bases, or the city): official Islamabad denied attacking Amritsar, but unofficial Pakistanis are bragging with… ‘setting something in Amritsar afire’…? Actually, a video showing a civilian car afire was released. It is known that a number of civilian homes was damaged by falling debris. This is imposing the question: what kind of ‘military base’ was ‘destroyed’ in Amritsar? Pending Islamabad providing any kind of evidence for something it claims it did not do, only one conclusion is on hand: Amritsar (whether city, or any of local Indian military installations) was certainly not ‘destroyed’.

- Beas: Yet another Pakistani claim was a ‘destruction of Brahmos Missile Storage BEAS’. Sure, ‘fire & smoke’ were reported from the major ammunition depot north of Beas (a town east of Amritsar and 70km from the border), but there was no conflagration like when a major weapons storage is actually hit (for comparison, see conflagrations caused by Russian sabotages of multiple ammunition storage sites in Ukraine, back in 2017, or results of Ukrainian attacks on multiple ammunition storage sites in Russia, in 2024-2025).

- Adampur AB (outside Jalandhar, housing one MiG-29UPG-squadron): Pakistan/China-spread photographs of supposed destruction of ‘two S-400 units’ at Adampur are inconclusive. The fact a SAM-site is in one position on one day, and then not there the next day, is no ‘evidence of destruction’ – especially not when there is no evidence the spot in question was actually hit (like scorched earth, craters, wreckage etc.). That said, Pakistan did hit something at Adampur AB, as ‘confirmed’ through the (publicly confirmed) death of one IAF airman. The reason for his loss remains unknown. Do I need to point out Modi’s visit to this air base, early on 11 May, showing it completely intact? Conclusion: this air base was certainly not ‘destroyed’.

- Udhampur AB (housing two IAF helicopter units): at least two Pakistani attack UAV or missile did hit Udhampur AB. Except for one casualty (seriously wounded) there is no evidence supporting Pakistani claims that ‘24+ personnel’ were killed there. ‘Smoke raising from within an air base’ is no evidence for ‘destruction of an air base’: as described again and again, air bases are big, heavily fortified facility, easily surviving dozens of hits. The crucial issue would be to find out what exactly was hit there: Pakistanis/Chinese have then released satellite photographs of Udhampur AB, purportedly showing ‘two hits’ (on the runway), but this turned out to be doctored/fake. Conclusion: this air base was certainly not ‘destroyed’.

Destruction of Indian S-400 battery: Pakistan provided no evidence for this claim. Circumstantial evidence from Indian mainstream- and social media is indicative of a possible damage to one or another element of a S-400 SAM-site deployed at Adampur AB.

Destruction’ of 3 Indian Akash SAM-systems in IAJK: first time I’ve heard of this claim. Pakistan definitely provided no evidence for it. Thus, I’m really curious to see any kind of a link to ‘neutral Indian military experts’ reporting something like that.

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Related to the issues above, was the following (excellent) question:

Q: If the S-400 are so good why Ukraine home made rockets and drones are able to get passed them. Does russia uses inferior S400 for its own defence.

Up front, there are no ‘Wunderwaffen’ (wonder weapons). There are no weapons that can do everything, win wars on their own (not even ‘nukes’ can do that). Rather than this, warfare is - just like entire humanity - a ‘system of systems’. A system of capabilities (including equipment, and thus armament) and intentions (planing, training etc.).

The S-400 is a system on its own, serving a very specific purpose. In Russian service, the purposes in question are such like targeting Ukrainian ballistic missiles or tactical aircraft over long ranges (100km+). Unsurprisingly, ‘even’ the Russians are rarely (if ever) shooting with S-400s at Ukrainian attack UAVs. For this purpose, S-400s are ‘integrated’ into integrated air defence systems, including numerous other radars, surface-to-air missile systems, and anti-aircraft artillery.

This is why, in Russia, wherever there are S-400s (these are operated by the Russian Air-Space Force), there are also Pantsyrs (SA-22s): these are short-range weapons, primarily tasked with defending the S-400 systems from such means of attack like UAVs. Indeed, the Russians are regularly adding their Buk M2 and M3 (SA-17), even Tors (SA-15s… both are operated by the Russian ground forces) to bolster protection of both the objects defended by S-400s and the defence of the S-400s.

In India, the IACCS integrated air defence system is including S-400, Barak-8, Akash, Spyder and Samar SAMs of the IAF, as well as (significantly upgraded) Osa-AKMs, ZSU-23-4 Shilkas, plus Bofors L/70 of the IAF and the Indian Army. And not only that: foremost - and like every other integrated air defence system - the IACCS is networking command nodes with a huge number of sensors (foremost, but not exclusively: radars) and weapons. This integration is undertaken with help of computerised data-links.

Mind that every of weapons systems integrated into such an air defence system has its own engagement envelope: each is used for countering different threats, depending on its range and maximum engagement altitude. Bonus of an integrated air defence system: it is ‘multi-layered’, comparable to an onion. One might overcome one of its layers, only to run into the next one, and then the next one, and next one.

Correspondingly, by the time you see a video of Ukrainian UAVs hitting a Russian S-400, ‘a lots of other things have happened, the mass of which is not shown on the video’.

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Q: (edited for easier understanding)… The Chinese bloggers are complaining their ZDK-03 is not given credit, but Saab Erieye radar is. I checked the Pakistan defence Yotube videos. They were complaining about ZDK-03 in 2024 but miraculously started praising them five days ago… Is the ZDK-03 radar upgraded to something comparable to an Erieye? Is it the opportunistic PRC trying to pitch it for exports without substance? What is your analysis. I know you mentioned Erieye guided the PL-15. The Chinese are adamant their ZDK-03 did.

Cool questions!

The Pakistan Air Force is presently operating the following AEW/AWACS aircraft (AEW = Airborne Early Warning; AWACS = Airborne early Warning and Control System):

- Saab 2000s (9 aircraft: No. 3 Squadron (Kamra/Minhas AB, west of Islamabad), and No. 53 Squadron (Bholari AB, SW of Hyderabad); and

- ZDK-03 (4 aircraft): No. 4 Squadron (Masroor AB, Karachi).

Why am I concluding it was the Saab 2000 Erieye that guided PL-15?

Reasons are of chronological, technical and geographic nature.

Development of both the PS-890 Erieye radar and a suitable ‘platform’ (aircraft) began well before that of the ZDK-03. Even in China, the first KJ-200 equipped with ‘Erieye-like, Chinese-derivative’ began in the early 2000s (‘which by no means means that this Chinese radar is based upon the Swedish-made Erieye, or ever distantly related to Swedish product’, of course: indeed, ‘any similarities are pure, distilled coincidence’…)

Sure, Swedes swear they’ve never sold any of Ericsson PS-890 Erieye radars to China. Well, it could be one or another fell off a truck, was carried away by ants, or hijacked by Mars People. Such things happen, you know… but fact is: closer inspection of dozens of photographs shown the ‘Chinese derivative/version’ is revealing that, technically, it’s exactly the same system, down to the last bolt and screw.

In China, the first of resulting KJ-200s was flown (from memory) already around 2005, and its development is continued until this very day (so much so, meanwhile some 4-5 different sub-variants are known, where older sub-variants seem to have been upgraded to latest standards).

Sure, the Erieye system is limited to covering 120° in azimuth on either side of the aircraft (i.e. it can’t scan to the front and behind the platform). It is also assessed as having a shorter range than the radar of the ZDK-03 (which seems to be an export variant of what eventually entered service as KJ-500 in the PRC). However, in turn it is assessed as having superior signal processing (see: ‘clutter handling’), resulting in superior detection capability. Particularly over the land. Better detection capability over the land is crucial for cooperative targeting (especially over the land) – which is where the mass of (known) air combats in this war took place.

As next, I see the Saab 2000’s superiority as ‘confirmed’ by the PAF continuing to acquire this type both after much of the original fleet was destroyed or damaged by the Taliban (in a raid on Kamra/Minhas, on 16 August 2012), and after the PAF received its four ZDK-03s. Indeed, the Saab 2000 was meanwhile acquired by additional air forces, elsewhere: the ZDK-03 not.

For comparison, the development of the ZDK-03 was initiated in 2008, and there is no independent confirmation it’s really equipped with an AESA radar. Moreover, while (officially) ‘designed specifically to PAF requirements’ its further development was stopped after just four aircraft made for Pakistan. Sure, the a ZDK-03-like KJ-500 was introduced to service in the PRC (just like the Erieye-equipped KJ-200). However, a combination of longer time available to research and develop the PS-890 Erieye and/or its Chinese derivative/version, and its commercial success, are speaking clear language in regards of its capabilities in comparison to the ZDK-03 – and its adaptability to new capabilities, including cooperative targeting. Therefore, to me – and in relation to Pakistan – the ZDK-03 appears like ‘fail safe’ solution. Something developed for the case Saab 2000 wouldn’t have been as successful, or at the time the further work on the… erm… ‘Chinese Erieye’ might have encountered problems or been delayed. On the contrary, RUMINT about the PAF being disappointed with the ZDK-03 to the degree where it was at least planning to withdraw them from service (where even the entire No. 4 Squadron was reportedly disbanded), ‘aired’ in 2023-2024, are contributing to this thesis.

Then, I’ve mentioned reasons of geographic nature. All reports about operations of PAF AEW/AWACS aircraft are indicative of air battles taking place over northern or central Pakistan (where Saab 2000s are operating), not over southern Pakistan (where ZDK-03s are operating). The PAF ZDK-03 fleet is home-based far away from where (Pakistan-emphasised) air battles of 7 May took place: there’s no point in hauling ZDK-03s all the way from Karachi to northern Pakistan, if there are two squadrons of Saab 2000s available at much closer air bases. (Of course, this must not ‘automatically’ mean that the ZDK-03 has no cooperative targeting capability, nor that is saw ‘no action at all’ from 7 to 10 May. On the contrary: it’s safe to assume they were airborne and supporting PAF operations over southern section of the border to India. It’s just so that they’re unlikely to have seen action during air battles early on 7 May, which are overemphasised by both Pakistan and the PRC.)

Finally, it’s the way the C-in-C Pakistan Air Force has shown his reconstruction of the ‘air battle of 7 May’ (see attachment above). There, the PAF AWACS was shown as flying a ‘long but narrow’ racetrack pattern over northern central Pakistan (indeed, almost ‘directly above’ the home-base of No. 3 Squadron). This track is indicative of this being an aircraft equipped with the Erieye AESA radar. As mentioned above, the Saab 2000 has a radar providing a coverage of 120 degrees to the side of the aircraft: no full 360 coverage (like the ZRK-03’s radar does). This is why it is flying such ‘long but narrow’ racetrack patterns. Correspondingly, Saab 2000 is operated so that it’s flying long stretches of its racetrack pattern perpendicular to the threat axis, then ‘quickly makes a 180 degree turn’, and returns to flying a long stretch of the racetrack pattern in opposite direction. The ZRK-03’s radar is providing 360° coverage. Means: it needs not flying such ‘long but narrow’ racetrack patterns.

As for why are Chinese bloggers emphasising the ZDK-03: sorry, but I’m no Chinese blogger and thus have no idea.

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(…to be continued…)

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This text is published with the permission of the author. First published here.