Life’s unfair: had to fully focus on finishing a few books, plus an online conference… mere 48+ hours for ‘doing something else but following ongoing wars’… and you saw what Israel did in Iran…
But OK, let’s dissect this operation in the usual, step-by-step fashion…
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It’s not like this attack came ‘entirely unexpected’: it’s expected for literal decades. Can still recall Israeli complaints that Iran is going to ‘10 minutes short of going nuclear’, from back in around 1996. Can recall (and still have many) articles published in specialised magazines back in the late 1990s, describing various new Israeli inventions and technologies developed to reach Iran, and a far lesser number of articles discussing development of Iranian inventions and technologies to reach Israel. Can recall (often fierce) discussions from the late 2000s about ‘Israel’s options’ for what routes to take in order to reach what parts of Iran, how many aircraft could it bring over place along what route, how many and what targets could it target… and what were the Iranian capabilities to counter, and to retaliate… With hindsight, it looks like it took time for specific technologies to become ‘ripe enough’ for their deployment. The same is valid for the geo-strategic situation, too: if nothing else, mind that prior to 2003, there was still ‘Saddam’s Iraq’ and ‘Assad’s Syria’ between Israel and Iran: nowadays, the two countries - and their air defence systems - are both in ruins… ‘the way was free’.
…and yet, gauging alone by bombastic announcements from various top commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) - especially those about their forces being ‘ready’, operating new ballistic missiles with 2,000-kilogram-heavy warheads and similar - they could never imagine what would happen to them. While, at least since what Ukraine did to Russia on 1 June this year (not to talk about earlier Israeli secret ops in Iran), this must’ve been obvious. But, sigh, that’s so with super-clever generals: they simply ‘never listen’…
So, from my point of view, nothing of this was a ‘surprise’.
Not even the timing.
The last not, because, originally, for today, Friday, 13 June 2025, a vote of confidence in Netanyahu’s cabinet was scheduled by the Knesset, Israel’s parliament: the ‘(beyond) far-right’ members of his cabinet were threatening to leave (if he wouldn’t attack Iran). Thus, Netanyahu, actually, had no option left but to attack Iran. He had to do that ‘today’ or his government would’ve collapsed and there would have been new elections in Israel, ‘with who-knows-what outcome’…
That the decision was final became obvious yesterday, when Israel issued an ultimatum: Iran was to immediately cease production of fissile material capable of fuelling nuclear weapons, otherwise Israel was to strike. And then, as so often, and to distract, yesterday, Israel also flew air strikes on several locations in southern Lebanon (Israel claimed to have killed, ‘a number of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force operatives when hitting Bayt Lif)…
The only open question was thus that of ‘how’.
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Operation Rising Lion
Have discussed the Iran’s integrated air defence system (IADS) - that is: there used to be two of these - already the last year in October: Quick and Dirty: the Two Iranian Air Defence Systems.
Now, alone the number of potential targets in Iran is… or was - so high, that disabling these in a ‘typical’ fashion - a classic ‘suppression of enemy air defences’ (SEAD) or even ‘destruction of enemy air defences’ (DEAD) fashion - ‘wouldn’t be enough’. Arguably, Israel is excelling in starting new wars, but also in having no idea how to end them. Therefore, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) is never fighting to ‘suppress’ or ‘just temporarily destroy’ something: it’s always fighting to completely obliterate. That determined the strategy - and thus the scope of what is termed with ‘Operation Rising Lion’ in Israel: a main blow against Iran. An all-out strike, destroying both of Iranian IADS’, then obliterating the facilities connected to the Iran’s nuclear program, and then obliterating Iran’s capability to defend over a longer period of time, too.
Since this morning, nobody less than Mossad - Israel’s top intelligence agency - is bragging around the social media how it smuggled enough operators and equipment into Iran to construct a secret drone base. Or, more likely: several of these. This morning, these drones were deployed to - simultaneously - strike at least two crucial Iranian air defence sites (the well-known, big radar station at Mt. Subashi, in Hamadan province, west of Tehran), and another one in Asfaqabad, outside Tehran. Around the same time, Mossad-operated drones also targeted a number of active surface-to-air missile (SAM) -sites.
Combined, this collapsed a big chunk of the IADS operated by the IRGC Air & Space Force (IRGCASF): it created a big ‘SAM-corridor’ pointing from the international border between Iraq and Iran - into central Iran.
Additionally, Mossad’s UAVs also went after transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) for Iranian ballistic missiles, as these began deploying out of their bases (pressumably: to launch ballistic missiles at Israel in reaction to strikes on radar sites).
As next, the Israelis sent their air force in. Word is that up to 200 Boeing F-15s, Lockheed-Martin F-16s, and Lockheed-Martin F-35s, supported by Boeing 707 tankers of the Israel Air & Space Force (IASF), were involved. Supported by long-range reconnaissance drones - mostly operated from Azerbaijan - they began releasing air-launched ballistic missiles like Blue Sparrow, Silver Sparrow, Golden Horizon, and Rampage, plus long-range loitering ammunition like Delilah-2, Ice Breaker and Wind Demon.
One or several such weapons first hit an underground command center, and that right at the time the ‘top-of-the-tops’ of the Iranian military brass was meeting there. With a single blow, the Israelis killed:
Indicating a high flexibility in the planning, command and control of this strike, the Israelis also took care to hit - whether by UAVs or by air-launched weapons - homes of two other top Iranian military commanders, both in Tehran:
That said, this ‘main blow’ was primarily targeting Iranian air defence facilities: radar stations and SAM-sites (in the latter cases: foremost Bavar-373, S-300, and 3rd Khordad systems).
The ‘next wave’ followed closely behind to strike the IRGC ballistic missile bases in Tabriz (3 officers and other ranks killed, 6 wounded), Kermanshah (this was particularly heavily hit), Qasr-e Shirin, Khoramabad (IRGCASF Imam Ali Missile Base), Bidkaneh (IRGC Missile Research & Development Centre), and the headquarters of the IRGCASF in Chitgar (in Tehran).
Finally, the next attack waves of the IASF focused on attacking the Iranian nuclear facilities. The heaviest hit was the one in Natanz (uranium enrichment).
This is a large underground complex, the most important part of which is housing a multi-level enrichment hall housing centrifuges, electrical rooms, and other support infrastructure. The Israelis further claim to have completely destroyed this underground part, including, ‘critical infrastructure enabling the site’s continued operations and advancement of the Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons project’. What’s also interesting is that the underground facilities at Natanz were specially constructed to survive such attacks: they were not only protected by reinforced mesh roofs, but the local fuel enrichment plant consisted of concrete vaults buried 30 metres under the ground, shielded by multiple layers of reinforced concrete and gravel. Means: the it took the Israelis multiple strikes at the same aiming points to ‘dig deep enough’ to reach and demolish it.
Natanz is something like the ‘heart’ of Iranian nuclear enrichment program. Thus, no surprise that this was heavily targeted. However, it’s interesting to observe that - so far - there are no reports about any strikes on the second major Iranian nuclear enrichment facility in Fordow (another enrichment plant for nuclear fuel, which, BTW, is much more heavily fortified, and also more modern, more advanced).
What did surprise me was that the IASF also heavily targeted the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Aviation base in Kermanshah (home-base of the helicopter-equipped 1st Combat Assault Group). Should have known better: this was an indication that the Israelis were after targeting ‘much more’ in Iran - today, and in the coming days.
A note for Syrians: nope, no ‘missiles/rockets’ were released by the Israelis at Syria (this time), but several jets have released their drop tanks on return from strikes on Iran. This one was photographed outside Sanamayn, in southern Syria:
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Except for striking Iran’s IADS and nuclear facilities, the Israelis also went after assassinating all the top Iranian nuclear scientists they could find. As far as is known, air strikes on Natanz have killed:
- Abdolhamid Minoucehr
- Ahmadreza Zolfaghari
- Seyed Amirhossein Faghahi, and
- Matlabi-Zadeh,
…while Mohammad-Mahdi Tehranchi, Abbas Fereydoun, and Ahmed-Reza Zolfaghari (one of six top Iranian nuclear scientists) were killed at their homes.
(Here it’s ‘interesting’ to see how ‘precisely’ Israel can strike on Iran… but not in Gaza…?)
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Official Tehran reacted… ‘quickly’. Already by 06.00hrs local time, the IRGCASF released a wave of 100 Shahed-136 attack UAVs at Israel. Some claimed up to 300 being released, but the IDF eventually claimed ‘only’ all 100 as shot down (by the IASF and by ‘allied forces’, including F-15 interceptors of the US Air Force and F-16AM of the Royal Jordanian Air Force).
By 09.00hrs local time,
- Admiral Habibollah Sayari was appointed the Interim Chief of General Staff,
- Brigadier-General Mohammad Pakpour as the new Commander IRGC (Brigadier-General Ahmad Vahid was held this position for several hours),
- Brigadier-General Ali Shadmani as the new commander Khatam-al-Anbiya HQ, and
- Brigadier-General Abdolrahim is the new C-in-C Iranian Armed Forces.
…that said, at this time I’m typing this, Tehran did not yet react with the ‘much expected’ ballistic missile strike. This is indicating that especially the IRGCASF’s missile units have suffered lots of damage.
Indeed, by the afternoon local time, Israeli UAVs (still operated from within Azerbaijan) began appearing in the sky over Tehran. For example, this Heron TP:
UAVs that are as big and as slow as this one, are easy to find and shot down - all provided the IRGCASF would still be capable of doing that. They would be even easier to find and shot down by interceptors of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) - all provided there would still be enough operational F-14 Tomcats, or at least F-4E Phantoms around. However, the last few years, the IRGC has (intentionally) decreased the funding for the IRIAF, and both fleets are in poor condition…
With other words: Israel has established at least ‘aerial domination’ deep inside the Iran’s airspace. The IASF is free enough to operate such reconnaissance UAVs over Iran, which in turn is enabling it to find, track and target additional targets as and where necessary.
…which in turn means that ‘much more is to follow’.
Indeed, it seems that during the day the IASF flew two additional waves of air strikes on Iran. One of these should have targeted the IRIAF’s MIM-23 I-HAWK SAM-sites at the Tactical Fighter Base 2, perhaps also the local hardened aircraft shelters (housing MiG-29 and Northrop F-5E/F Tiger IIs), and then the IRGCASF’s missile base outside Tabriz (north-western Iran), certainly causing extensive damage:
Another caused a massive damage and a large fire at the Tactical Fighter Base 7, outside Shiraz - the home-base of the IRIAF’s fleet of Sukhoi Su-24 fighter-bombers (which have the range to reach Israel).
This, in turn, is indicative of the Israelis being ‘happy’ about demolishing the IRGCASF’s command system, and its large units operating ballistic missiles with the range to Israel… and now re-focusing on destroying the IRIAF’s capability to hit Israel, too.
If so… well, by side the ‘de-capitation’ strikes: the IRGC has it easy to replace its killed top brass. Indeed, new, younger commanders, must be expected to be much more aggressive, and far smarter than the others.
However, if Israel is meanwhile striking IRIAF’s air bases… then this was a ‘mega blow’ upon Iran: it disabled much of its two IADS’, it disabled the ‘heart’ of Iran’s nuclear program, and now can go after almost any other targets it wants to destroy.
With other words: this was something like ‘Indo-Pakistani War of 7-10 May & Ukrainian UAV-strike on the Russian bomber fleet, compressed into less than 12 hours’ - and yes, a ‘clear cut victory for Israel’.
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The actual question is now how to end this. That’s something Israel simply can’t do, no matter how much and what it might bomb and destroy in Iran - whether the last night, today, tomorrow or any time in the future: that outcome is depending on the survivability of the regime in control of the Islamic Republic of Iran. And that regime is no ‘monolithic bloc’, but consists of a number of ‘cliques’ or ‘interest groups’: people, mostly tightly related to the IRGC, and in control over different branches of the armed forces, different segments of the economy, and different urban centres.
Provided this regime can survive the loss of so many top leaders at once, this is nothing else but Israel ‘playing with the lion’s tail’: in such case, this one is now going to go ‘for years’, and become particularly bloody.
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PS While I was collecting all the info and typing this, the last 1-1,5 hours, additional Israeli air strikes were reported from Tehran, Parchin, and Qom. The IASF should have hit two additional air bases of the IRIAF, plus the nuclear complex of Fordow. Indeed, Israeli media is reporting that the IASF is now ‘operating over Iran for 17 hours without interruption’.
Guess, some of IRGC’s generals might now have second thoughts about prohibiting the acquisition of modern fighter-interceptors for the IRIAF, over the years, and ‘putting all their eggs into one basket’: ballistic missiles… but then, who am I to say…
This text is published with the permission of the author. First published here.