And so, a great story has come to an end — the story of Atatürk’s party, which founded modern Turkey and existed for 103 years.

The Republican People’s Party, known worldwide by its Turkish acronym CHP, will most likely lose what remains of its popularity, its recognized leaders, and the hundreds of mayors who took office in cities and towns two years ago within just a few hours. And most likely, all this opposition energy will flow into a completely new political force: one without a history, without state funding, but with the drive and motivation to overthrow the regime that has taken hold in the country.

The CHP has almost repeated the history of Europe’s authoritarian parties, which replaced monarchies in the early 20th century and established one-party systems. However, it was the CHP that introduced a multiparty system in 1946 and lost the election, becoming the opposition in 1950. Nevertheless, it did not resist the military coup of 1960 and regained power through coalitions with rivals from the right-wing and religious spectrums. Atatürk’s party last won an election in 1977, and after another military coup in 1980, it was banned for the first time — along with the rest of the country’s political forces. After democracy was restored and banned parties were allowed to be revived, it rose from the ashes; however, its electorate was split among the remaining center-left forces, led by charismatic leaders, and for many years it remained on the margins of Turkish political life.

After the major political upheaval at the beginning of this century, most Turkish political parties faded into obscurity. Two remained on the political stage. The newly formed Justice and Development Party (AKP) of the young political dissident Recep Erdogan won its first victory in 2002 and came to power, while Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party (CHP) took second place, becoming the main opposition force for many years to come.

It seemed that in 21st-century Turkey, Ataturk’s party was doomed to hit a 25% ceiling and remain a political force of the educated minority in major cities and along the coast. It was, in a sense, an opposition to His Majesty, because for 22 years the Republican People’s Party had lost to Erdoğan in all national and local elections and in several referendums. However, it unexpectedly won the 2024 local elections. With a result of 38%, the CHP became the number one party in the country. This happened six months after the party leadership changed — 74-year-old Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who had led the CHP for 13 years, was replaced by 48-year-old Özgür Özel, who was backed by the hugely popular mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu.

Since then, Turkish political chess has turned into a game of Chapaev. Within a year, the authorities had unleashed their entire repressive apparatus against the opposition, aiming to destroy genuine rivals who were not prepared to remain mere opposition window dressing for the rest of their lives and to maintain the appearance of democracy in Turkey for export.

From October 2024 to the present, the Turkish authorities have removed more than fifty mayors from Atatürk’s party from office. More than half of them are in prison. Yet, Turks do not believe the allegations of corruption, because it is somehow hard to believe that in a country where the entire security apparatus — including the intelligence services and the court — has been under the control of a single person for over 10 years, only opposition mayors turn out to be corrupt. Despite the high-profile midnight arrests and mass detentions of CHP mayors, the party has ranked first nationwide in polls conducted by most polling agencies for the second consecutive year.

Therefore, the authorities took a desperate step, indicative of their panic and fear of the opposition — on May 21, 2026, the Ankara Court of Appeals ruled that the party convention held in November 2023 was invalid. The leadership elected at that time was removed, and the compliant 77-year-old Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was reinstated as party leader. For two months, the party’s young leaders — who had inspired the country with their first victory in 2024 — tried to return to the political arena through legal channels. However, their efforts were in vain.

Through this court ruling, the authorities violated unwritten taboos and their own laws, because aside from Turkey’s Supreme Electoral Council, no one else can determine the validity of party elections.

The Turkish Supreme Electoral Council has the status of a special court, and its members are exclusively judges. Furthermore, the passive stance of the Supreme Court— which did not dare to grant a swift appeal and postponed consideration of the case until the fall — forced the elected (and ousted) party leadership to accept Kılıçdaroğlu’s appointment and proceed with Plan B: to form a new party so as not to forfeit the right to participate in potential early elections.

Such a plan had been discussed long before the controversial court ruling on May 21. The crackdown on the nationalist and Kurdish camps indicated that Erdoğan’s inner circle would do everything possible to ensure that Atatürk’s party also joined a unified alliance modeled after the Russian example. Call yourselves whatever you want — communists or fascists—but a tsar/sultan must be at the forefront.

Currently, 91 of the 135 members of the Turkish parliament who were part of the CHP parliamentary group have announced their resignation from the party to form a new one. Its name has not yet been announced. Özgür Özel is expected to announce the details after Friday prayers on July 24. The date was not chosen at random and coincides with the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, which defined the borders of the modern Republic of Turkey.

A week before the new party’s formation, three polling firms, including the reputable Metropoll agency, released party approval ratings. In all surveys, the as-yet-unannounced party led by Özgür Özel ranks first with a result ranging from 32 to 35 percent. Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party trails by 2 percent at best, with 30 percent, and at worst barely reaches 27 percent. Meanwhile, the traditional CHP, which Kılıçdaroğlu secured through the courts, fails to clear the 7 percent threshold. However, this is not a cause for concern. Under Turkish law, all parties that receive more than 3 percent of the vote are eligible for state funding, and the government is capable of ensuring such support for the token opposition.

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