(…continued from Part 1…)

***

What can be assessed about overall effects of the Operation Spider Web?

It is foremost a major propaganda coup. Mind that all too many people are still considering ‘strategic bombers’ for something like ‘symbol of military might’ - although these were replaced by intercontinental ballistic missiles in the role of ‘primary means of strategic deterrent’ already back in the early 1960s. Arguably, bombers have recovered some of their strategic capability through the widespread addition of cruise missiles, initiated in the 1980s: indeed, much of the Russian pride in themselves as a ‘superpower’ came from the posession of a fleet of strategic bombers capable of deploying such weapons.

No doubt, propaganda is a fundamental part of warfare: whoever can impress the public opinion in one or another fashion, can appear as ‘victorious’ even when not successful at all (should there be any doubts, check the latest ‘success’ by Pakistan against India… at least in ‘the West’).

However - and that’s especially valid for such cool heads like Don, not to talk about such sarcastic jerks like Tom - one has to keep ‘military realities’ in mind all the time. With this war going on into its fourth year, not only that much of the DA’s bomber-fleet was worn out, but even the Russian capability to manufacture such cruise missiles like Kh-101 was greatly degraded - to no small degree due to the dependence on import of (principally) US-made chips and motherboards. Indeed, much of the Tu-22M-3-fleet was ‘doing nothing’ for the last year: the stocks of their Kh-32 air-to-surface missiles were largely exhausted, and downing of one such bomber by Ukrainian S-200/SA-5 Gammon long-range clearly exposed their vulnerability to air defences. Contrary to the Russian claims, the fleet was never upgraded to an advanced standard, nor re-equipped with what is wrongly called the ‘Kh-47’ (actually: 9-S-7760 Kinzhal/AS-24 Killjoy): the only type in Russian service capable of deploying that weapon remains the MiG-31K - and there is no evidence that any of these were hit yesterday. Point is: already before this Ukrainian operation, the actual value of Tu-22M-3s for Russia was degraded to the level where it’s surprising Pudding didn’t order their crews being re-trained as infantry and sent to assault Pokrovsk…

Moreover, SBU’s claims to have destroyed ‘Russian aircraft worth US$7 billion’ - is entirely pointless: whatever the type, all were manufactured during the times of the USSR, and Pudding didn’t spend a single cent of his… erm… Russian money to acquire them.

From the military point of view, much more important is the evidence that the Ukrainians seem to have managed knocking out 2-5 Tu-95s: due to the decreased number of FMC-airframes, those few aircraft that have been confirmed- or can be concluded as destroyed have represented up to 50% of the fleet actually involved in operations against Ukraine (through releasing Kh-101s).

That said, the DA’s fleet of Tu-160s seems to still be around: as of 24 hours after these attacks, there is no evidence that any of these have been hit.

Similar is valid for the Russian fleet of A-50s: even if one was damaged or destroyed, their losses of early 2024 have already forced the Russian Air-Space Force (VKS) to keep them away from the battlefield. The fleet was down to seven, perhaps eight A-50s already a year ago, while the A-100-project was cancelled in February 2024, because the Russians couldn’t obtain the necessary electronics from ‘the West’. Thus, sorry, but the effects of any kind of damage from an attack on the Russian A-50s is going to remain extremely limited.

What’s more: presently, there is no evidence that the SBU has attempted targeting any of Russian units operating Shahed/Geran attack-UAVs, nor those operating Iskander ballistic missiles: the types of weapons deployed to execute the mass of strikes deep into Ukraine over the last two years, and causing most damage and casualties.

Combined, this means that the Russians are going to remain capable of striking Ukraine both with Kh-101 cruise missiles, with Shahed/Geran (and similar) long-range attack-UAVs, and with Iskanders (not to talk about cruise missiles launched from their warships and submarines in the Black Sea).

***

From our point of view, much more important is going to be the ‘cummulative effect’ of this effort: mind that during the last two weeks, the Ukrainians have carved’ at least two major ‘SAM-corridors’ through the Russian air defences deployed along the international border. This was done through systematic assault (usually by UAVs, but by a few Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG missiles, too) against Russian ground-based air defence systems (foremost Buk/SA-17 Grizzly and Tor/SA-15 Gauntlet).

(As for how and why is that done, see earlier features the links to which are available here: IADS, Part 2.)

The resulting corridor/s is (are) enabling the Ukrainians to deploy dozens of their UAVs against targets deep inside Russia. The last night, two such corridors were exploited to deploy UAVs into strikes at Borisoglebsk and Lipetsk air bases, just for example; additional strikes were reported from Kursk, Ryazan, Voronezh - and also from Rostov, in the south. Exactly what kind of damage was caused where, remains unclear, but: the Keystone Cops in Moscow (the Russian Ministry of Defence) claimed to have shot down 164 Ukrainian UAVs during the night, indicating the size of this effort.

Provided the SBU (and other Ukrainian services) now continue systematically deploying long-range attack UAVs to hit, damage, perhaps even disable major elements of the Russian arms-manufacturing industry (including at least two UAV-factories), and then continue keeping this sector of the Russian economy under pressure (nobody ever won any war by striking one arms factory just one time), this is near-certain to have clear and lasting consequences.

In this regards, one has to hope the Ukrainians have learned from their - and Russian, too - earlier failures, caused by haphazard selection of targets, and strikes run in entirely random fashion (see: one type of targets on one day, or in one week, entirely another type of targets the next day/week etc.).

***

The attacks on the airfields were not the only internal threats that appeared last week. The head of an aviation defense company was attacked by a man with a hammer but survived.

Russia is investigating the death of two men by an explosion in Stavropol. One was Major Zaur Gurtsiev, said to have been responsible for the aerial bombardment of Mariupol and later became its deputy mayor (note: how could a major of the Russian armed forces, and then a minor political figure, be ‘responsible’ for ‘managing aerial bombardment of Mariupol’ - is not explained, neither by the Russians nor the Ukrainians).

On the morning of May 30th, two explosions occurred at the Vladivostok training base of the 155th Marine Brigade, a unit that is hated by the Ukrainian army for the atrocities they committed. Ten ambulances and an evacuation helicopter were sent to the site. Damaged military equipment and specialized hardware were reportedly covered with tarps and removed on trucks. Two passenger cars were hauled away under tarps. Roads were blocked off and helicopters were circling in the air before the explosions according to one report. Drivers near the base had their cars searched. Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence was reportedly behind the operation. Russia said the explosions were caused by gas cylinders and no one was hurt.

In Bryansk, a bridge collapsed as a passenger train passed beneath it, derailing the train and killing 7, while injuring 76. Russia initially claimed it was sabotage but later removed that statement. On the same night, a second bridge collapsed in Kursk and derailed a cargo train and injured a leg of one of the train engineers. The Russians later stated that both incidents were caused by explosions.

While there is no doubt that all of these operations are ‘bringing the war to Russians’ - even causing complaints about general ignorance of the fact the country is at war, appearing in the social media - one should keep in mind: they’re still having only a minimal impact on the ‘Moscovites’ and the ‘Burgers’. Citizens of two Russian metropoles - Moscow and St Petersburg, respectively: the people that ‘actually matter’ to Pudding.

Foremost: this all is still having a minimal impact upon the Russia’s overall war-fighting capability. It is neither significantly decreasing the capability of the Russian armed forces to continue striking deep into Ukraine, nor their capability to continue advancing - no matter how slowly, and regardless what losses are they suffering in the process - into Ukraine.

Thus, sorry: it’s not only that we’ve both been ‘vaccinated’ against SBU’s claims about massive damage caused to Russia over the last two years, but we simply do not feel there is a reason for celebrations and staging parties. Congratulate the people involved; it was a nice success; and then carry on.

***

(…to be continued with a review of latest developments elsewhere, in the Part 3…)

‍

This text is published with the permission of the author. First published here.

‍