(Intro by Tom Cooper)

‍

Hello everybody!

Yes, time for another weekly summary of developments in Ukraine - where… really, I must admit, up front: I’m very surprised. Repeat for emphasis: very surprised.

You see, ever since they’ve launched their campaign of long-range strikes into Russia, sometimes back in 2023 (that’s so long ago, I admit: I cannot clearly remember when this was initiated), Ukrainians were excelling in tit-for-tat targeting. Each of seven or eight different branches of armed forces and intelligence services operating UAVs that could reach more than 40-50km behind the ‘frontline’ was targeting something else. Nobody - the least of all Ukrainians, not to talk about the Russians - could make up their minds about what exactly are Ukrainians targeting.

Arguably, that made things for the Russians particularly problematic: what to defend? And where? And when…?

However, it also meant that there was no cumulative effect - like, for example, disabling the Russian oil-industry, big style, and then: for an extended period of time. Add to this the ‘sensitiveness’ of ‘Western allies’ to oil prices and… well, ‘no surprise’: they began exercising pressure upon Kyiv not to hit Russia too hard. As result, and roughly, over the last 20 months some 20% of that industry was damaged, Pudding’s income began decreasing, but the Russians were also given enough time to start repairing (because there were no new strikes on installations that were already damaged), and thus remained capable of continuing to earn through exporting.

‘This time’ (where: ‘this time’ stands for the last 40 days) it’s different - at least in so far that the Ukrainian long-range strikes on the Russian oil/gas infrastructure are going on and on, and ever more installations are hit, damaged, and knocked out of operations. For example, the last night Ukrainians have blown up the Sheskharis oil terminal: the second biggest in Russia after the one in UstLuga (which was already blown up).

Now lets hope there are going to be re-strikes, too. So to hamper, slow down, perhaps even nullify repairs.

(I know: that with ‘hope’ and ‘Ukraine’ in a single sentence… but hey: hope dies the last!)

To make sure: no, I am not ‘happy’ about this. Not even ‘amused’. It is obvious that this campaign would have a direct impact upon your and my ‘everyday life’ even without IQ47’s and Babe’s stupid (and, meanwhile: little else but barbaric, too) war of aggression on Iran. Principally because our modern-day economies are hopelessly overdependent on the mental state of hysteric and greedy gamblers that are easily outmatching anybody diagnosed with gambling addiction. And the mental state of plentiful of helpless zombie idiots, who cannot even articulate themselves reasonably, not to talk about making decisions.

But, I understand, and accept, that - with all of our zombie idiots wasting four years of this war to fail to reform, invest, and re-arm (not only ‘us’, but especially Ukraine) - there is no other way to knock out Russia from Pudding’s war aggression and extermination of Ukraine without knocking out his capability to continue financing his Three-Days Special Military Operation. I’m aware of and accepting the consequences.

Arguably, right now even Ukrainian contacts are not sure: is it Fedorov - the new Minister of Defence - who is playing this one well? Or is it Magyar who performs better than at earlier times? Or is that the cumulative effect of Fedorov’s, Magyar’s or somebody else’s decisions…?

Considering that with ‘victories have lots of fathers…’ (and defeats none), that might take time to find out. Thus, lets hand over to Don while we’re waiting to see.

Sumy

A Bohdana SPG was hit south of Krasnopillia, 13 km from the front lines.

Vovchansk

A thermobaric attack on front line positions.

Kupiansk

Three Russians tried to raise a flag in Kivsharivka and were among six that were captured, while four others were killed.

Russians use laser-guided artillery shells in Petropavlivka and Kupiansk. Ukraine conducts an airstrike in Petropavlivka. Russians are attacked northeast of Petropavlivka.

Russians are attacked north of Pishchane. Russians are attacked 4 km west of Pishchane.

Ukrainians in Kupiansk are attacked.

An ambulance was hit by a drone 32 km northwest of Kupiansk, killing two medics and wounding one.

Lyman

A Ukrainian helicopter fires on Russian troops near Lyman.

A Russian mobile radio relay was attacked.

Russians at the eastern edge of Lyman are attacked.

A Ukrainian UGV detonates in a house in Novoselivka.

3rd Corps troops clear Yarova of Russians.

Ukrainians south of Yampil are attacked. Russians in Yampil are attacked.

Sloviansk

A Russian motorcycle attack is stopped.

Kramatorsk was attacked for no military purpose.

Kostiantynivka

The 28th Brigade shells Russians approaching Kostiantynivka from the southeast.

A Russian airstrike.

Pokrovsk

On the southern edge of Pokrovsk, a Russian vehicle is attacked.

Talking about Pokrovsk, one cannot avoid talking about consequences of Glavcom Syrsky’s mindless chopping apart of ZSU units. He’s so good at this game, that the elements of his hard-driven 425th Skala Assault Regiment are meanwhile deployed in the Kupiansk-, Pokrovsk-, Udachne-, and Ternova-sectors.

Can you imagine the happiness of the regimental commander for having his unit - a single regiment - torn apart that hard, it’s strewn over four different sectors? That’s like if you’re supposed to drive a car the steering wheel of which is in Paris, the gas pedal in Madrid, the engine in Tombouctou, the wheels in London, the brakes in Damascus, and the trunk in Berlin…

But, that’s exactly what the General of Fantastic News expects his Toy Soldiers to do. Kind of ‘unsurprisingly’, the assault regiments have been fighting hard - in particular, the 425th and 225th regiments - and they have had heavy losses in men and equipment. And yes, ‘unsurprisingly’ considering their ‘status’, they’ve received twenty times the replacements of other brigades, a practice that Syrsky has long conducted, and is still conducting - although nobody less than his delighted Pres Zele ordered this to stop, and there to be equal distribution of men and equipment to all units….

But wait: it’s getting better! Lately, the 425th is also fighting in Hryshne: an assault under the cover of fog towards Pokrovsk resulted in the destruction - and loss - of an M1117, a BMP2 and damage to the M1 tank. Actually ‘logically’, an advisor to the Minister of Defense criticized the leadership of the regiment for conducting the attacks in the same manner as the Russians. The leadership of the 425th reacted ‘strongly’, saying there was minimal loss of life and its 1st Battalion assembled for a photo and a public appeal, even though the assembly is against Ukrainian law because of the danger of Russian missile strikes.

Due to the lack of specific figures, everybody is left to guess what exactly does that ‘minimal loss of life’ mean…?

Meanwhile, the 425th is being investigated because five of its soldiers died from pneumonia and the family members said it was because they wouldn’t let them go to the hospital.

There are reports that soldiers are abused by the command of the 425th and 225th and that their phones are taken from the soldiers so they cannot talk to anyone. Certainly, phones should not be used in range of enemy firepower because they can be tracked and provide a location for drone and artillery attacks, but that should not be a concern in the rear areas. By contrast, the 210th Assault Regiment had a completely different command environment when visited by the Deputy Military Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman also noted that a regimental staff cannot control 15 battalions…which… hand on heart: is actually an equivalent to a division! So, the actual questio nis: why still call it a ‘regiment’?

Mind, something like two years ago, the ZSU had no assault regiments at all. They were formed to serve as Syrsky’s private army because so many other commanders refused to follow his orders. The commanders of his Toy Soldiers are never doing that: they’re following his orders to the last dot and comma. Regardless the cost.

Some say such conclusions are wrong: we think that’s 100% accurate. Dozens of reports indicating bitter disagreement with his micromanagement and habit of ordering assaults that have no sensible reason, no or little planning, no coordination and did not support an objective other than to take ground - are all confirming this.

These objections weren’t just from leadership that came from civilian life and had no plans to have a military career. Yes, they objected, but so did many others, including commanders of Airborne Assault- and Airborne units. The Kursk invasion was one such example of an operation without an objective. The commander of the 80th Air Assault Brigade disagreed with the order and was fired by Syrsky. Once inside Kursk, the experienced commanders coordinated among themselves and led the inexperienced units because guidance from above first created utmost chaos, and then did not follow up.

The Air Assault/Airborne units used to be the army’s primary assault units, but the professional leaders provided resistance to bad orders so Syrsky formed a new command with leadership that would not question his orders, no matter the cost in lives. If they ran out of troops because of poor leadership then the attacks would come to an end at some point. But with plenty of replacements and a priority on equipment, the leadership can expend them as they see fit.

Bottom line: turn it as you like, but there is no military explanation for why Syrsky is still in command. Just like there is no point in having thousands of Ukrainian troops unnecessarily killed or maimed for ‘political reasons’ the objectives of which are almost without exception bordering on science fiction.

‍

This text is published with the permission of the author. First published here.