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Hello everybody!
Few weeks ago, a reader from Ukraine contacted me to - kindly - congratulate for one of @War books from the sub-series ‘War in Ukraine’ - and then attached a photo… a photo showing an evacuation point in a certain city in Ukraine.
I’ll not go into details about the city in question, nor post that photo: those who are following me since longer than 3-4 posts, know I’m never discussing my contacts/sources, nor anything that might point in their direction.
My point is this: the photo was presenting evidence that the authorities in (at least) specific Ukrainian city/ies began organising exercises of the local civil defence organisations.
As is normal in situations of that kind, such exercises - accompanied by reported evacuations of the local public archives - have then prompted the creation and circulation of all possible sorts of rumours. Primary between these was that the Russians have broken through the last defence line to… the city in question. And, since there are no major natural obstacles - nor, apparently, and kind of major Ukrainian defence lines - between Pokrovsk and… the city in question… conclusion was obvious: the authorities can’t protect the city.
Now, at the time, I was distracted by private affairs. Thus, didn’t follow as carefully as the last 3,5 years (or the last few days), which is never a good thing to do if one wants to remain well-informed - whether about this war or any other. But… well, from my point of view, at that point in time, and after a quick glance on a map, the situation appeared ‘obvious’: it’s not that there is something like an epidemic of such affairs in Ukraine now, but yes, there are still a few places with functioning authorities. And functioning authorities tend to organise exercises of civil defence services. Also to organise evacuation points. ‘Not just’ air raid shelters, heaters and power-supply in the winter etc.
Therefore, and because I’ve had no info on any kind of Russian breakthroughs, have attempted to console the good reader. No idea how successfully, but I’ve tried my best under the given circumstances (a quick summary of which was: I was about to leave for a funeral).
With hindsight, two weeks later, things do look significantly different.
Yes, there was no ‘Russian breakthrough’ - in classic sense. Hand on heart: nowadays, this is impossible alone because Pudding has managed to degenerate the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (VSRF) to the degree where these cannot effect such a breakthrough. At least not in form of a classic, massive, mechanised assault any more.
But, it must’ve been about that time (about two weeks ago) that the people in responsible positions outside the immediate combat zone in the eastern Ukraine have figured out that the things in the Pokrovsk area are… ‘going south’: developing in (particularly) negative direction.
Which then reminded me of something I’ve experienced in almost every single of TV-interviews granted to Ukrainian channels the last… no idea any more. At least one year or so. See: there was always the question of, ‘what do you think, how long until they reach…’ - the place XY. So, between others, sometimes in spring of the last year, I’ve assessed the Russians as taking about a year to reach Pokrovsk…
Now, to make things easier for you and for me, have created the following map. The ‘frontlines’ are rather rough: not even ‘seriously approximate’. Still, I think everybody’s got the picture: the ‘red-shaded’-area is what the Russians are already holding.
To this, I’ve added two sets of semi-cricles. The range of these semi-circles is equaling the approximate distance the Russians have advanced in the last 1-1,5 years. Since around the fall of Avdiivka.
This is also my estimate for how far they might reach in,
Mind: this, only on the condition of the ZSU remaining capable of offering at least the same quality and volume of resistance like it’s offering the last 1-1,5 years.
…where, hand on heart: with the current leadership in Kyiv, this is unlikely to remain that way.
Read: under the current conditions, the combat effectiveness of the ZSU is definitely going to continue degenerating. This is something where no drones can help - not only because new methods of countering drones are constantly emerging, but also because, thanks to its inept political- and military commanders, and the inability of the characters in question to reform the command & control system, and thus the training of its armed forces (not to talk about war-logistics), Ukraine continues losing not only heavy equipment and infantry, but also drone-pilots - and that at ill-affordable rates.
In turn, and because 0+0 is always 0, no matter in what corner of the universe: not only that the ZSU is suffering from mass-defections, but the quality of its drone-pilots is constantly decreasing, too.
Now, please feel free to fall all over me again. Go into the online-psychologist-mode and tell me I’m hysteric, and sensationalist, and frustrated (quote) ‘because nobody is following my personal ideology’. Add some ‘Ukraine-hater’, and ‘nobody cares about your opinion’ to that. Thanks a lot: I’m promptly feeling much better.
…but, please, kindly keep in mind: for their part, the Russians - and Pudding in particular - have demonstrated exactly the same skills in degenerating their own military capabilities. This went so far that the modern-day VSRF can only be compared with a uniformed- and armed mob of kamikaze infantry. So, if you like: use Russia as an example for your insistence that one can degenerate one’s military capability below all acceptable levels, and still continue advancing - just for example (even if, yes, ‘it’s just for 2-10 metres here, and 200 metres there, whether per day, week or month).
…the application of such standards is certainly going to result in a massive improvement in the combat effectiveness of the ZSU, and lead straight into Ukraine’s accession to NATO… eh?
Oh yes: I’m sure it will… 🙄
But, that’s not important. Because, you know, the management skills, organisation and training of military forces, improvement of combat effectiveness of armed forces at war, improved acquisition of arms and ammo, improved air defences, military technology (‘that’s too complex’), military sciences - and all these other military-related affairs: everybody with an internet connection in our days knows that nothing of that matters at war. All that matters is to be positive. Not to doom, not to be pessimistic, but to believe, and everything’s going to be fine…
…and everything’s going to be Ukraine, too…
***
And still, as an admitted weirdo and nerd, and then a nifty atheist, too: I do dare seeing a certain… I should stress: very little, really tiny, almost entirely unimportant - problem.
By all the promises of the ‘nearing collapse of the Russian economy’, ‘massive damage to the Russian oil/gas sector caused by Ukrainian drone-strikes’ and similar fire & smoke news, even by all the reports about the significant decrease in the Russian mobilisation rate… well, the VSRF ‘still’ has at least 600,000-, probably 800,000 or more troops deployed in Ukraine. And, even should it squander, say, 50% of these while continuing its push from Pokrovsk - whether, say, in western direction (towards Dnipro), or in northern direction (towards Kramatorsk) - hm… well, that itch in my small toe is telling me: Pudding can still afford that.
Can Ukraine afford the same rate of losses and desertions like the last and this year?
My assessment is that the answer is negative. But hey: why should my ‘opinion’ matter?
Well, if you’ve decided to continue reading beyond this point: then OK, but at your own discretion.
Point is this: although a hysteric stupid, I happen to be unable to avoid the conclusion that by, for example, either reaching Dnipro (the river) - whether in Dnipro or in Zaporizhzhya, or (though more likely) in between - or by encroaching the Siversk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the south (and, thanks to the near-certain reconquest of Kupyansk, Lyman and Izyum, also from the north), the Russians would have quite nice outlooks to create yet another big cauldron. Or even two.
And, well, sorry but: it wasn’t me who’s lost every single cauldron-battle of this war.
I’m just a hysteric jerk who dares reminding: it wasn’t the Russians either…
…with which, I ‘think’ the definition of the two most likely directions of the Russian advances ‘beyond Pokrovsk’ is quite easy: either towards West, or towards North. Perhaps even both (the ability to go for that solution depends on the rate at which the ZSU might continue disintegrating).
***
Having concluded that, now lets go over a few levels higher: the outcome of this war.
Some do not understand how can (how dare) I say ‘Ukraine is now losing this war’ - because earlier I’ve said ‘Russia cannot win this war’.
That’s both so incomprehensible as contradictory, isn’t it?
It’s not like if the same characters have missed such of my blog-features like the one where I’ve explained that with winning and losing wars. Nah. It’s on me to blame (and I’m hysteric… and anti-Semitic, too): probably because it’s impossible to understand that ‘Russia cannot win this war’ does not mean that Ukraine can’t lose it. That it ‘merely’ means that Pudding cannot finish this war the way he intended to do, three days… erm.. 3,5 years ago: with the downfall of the Zelensky regime. He cannot, for example, seize Kyiv, arrest or kill the government and then impose some sort of a puppet regime. Because… surprise, surprise… the VSRF (where I’m including the VDV and the GRU to that bunch) has lost its military capability to run such operations. At war.
But, as surprising as this is going to be for many, a lots of water went down the Dnipro ever since (even more so since the Russians blew up the Nova Kakhovka Dam)…. actually, thinking of it: isn’t it contradictory that there’s still any water in the Dnipro, or in any other river - although so much went down the last 3,5 years…?
Oh, I’m digressing…
…point is: regardless how much water went down so many rivers, the last XY amount of time, yet (surprise, surprise) the rivers in question are still existent, and contrary to the Ukrainian leadership, Pudding has shown at least one quality. He has proven himself as capable to learn, to accept facts and to adapt. And so Pudding began adjusting his ‘war plan’ already very early in his special military operation. From the Plan A - conquest of Kyiv, toppling the regime, in 3-15 days etc - via the Plans B, C, D, E, F… meanwhile to something like the ‘Plan S, with promising outlooks for the Plan T’ - which, see there: is ‘returning him to at least some of the Plan A’…
Which is: complete conquest of all four of Ukrainian oblasts he’s largely conquered already back in 2022, plus whatever additional terrain he can grab. For example: east of the Dnipro.
A screen-grab from the page 32 of the book War in Ukraine, Volume 7, reconstructing the gradual downsizing of the Russian strategic planning for the conquest Ukraine. That was back in 2022. More than three years later, thanks to endemic incompetence in Kyiv (and NATO), Pudding & The Keystone Cops are on the best way of returning to the Plan A… arguably, through the Plans S and T…
Why?
Because: why stop advancing, why stop the conquest, if the government in Kyiv and the Glavcom ZSU - ‘ably supported by their Western allies’ - are so kind as to enable Pudding to grab more?
Bottom line: yes, Russia remains unable to win this war - at least the way Pudding would like to win it, or has intended to win it, back on 22-23 February 2022. But, it’s on the best way of realising up to one third of its original Plan A. Moreover, Pudding’s regime is firmer in control of the country than ever before, and perfectly fine with the way the war is developing. As well as with the war going on and on and on the way it does…
***
On the contrary, Ukraine is now clearly losing this war. Indeed, it can be said its government is doing its best to lose this war - and then as heavily as only imaginable.
This is so because its government defined the outcome of the war with ‘everything is going to be Ukraine’. Read: a complete recovery of the entire territory of the country (‘as of before February 2014’). An objective this government simply can’t reach.
Worse yet: due to incredible volumes of its own strategic mistakes and failures, and all of its illusions, that government has also neutralised its own ability to directly influence the outcome… which, at war - surprise, surprise - is by the means of its armed forces, the ZSU.
This means that - for example - while, back in 2022, perhaps even in 2023, Ukraine still had some trace of semblance of having the options to gain one or another major win, thus forcing Pudding to end the war, 3,5 years later, Ukraine is hopelessly out of condition to win this war through its own actions. The ZSU has ever less troops, ever less heavy weaponry, and is barely holding out in regards of ammunition. This has such effects like that nowadays the Ukrainian government is also unable to ‘strongly influence’ at least any kind of negotiations for some sort of a cease-fire. This is why meanwhile such negotiations are run by somebody else but by Ukraine. And sorry but: this somebody else doesn’t care if Ukraine is ready for this or that kind of concessions, or not.
…which results in the conclusion that the most likely outcome of this war is that it’s NOT going to be concluded by Ukrainians, but definitely ‘on their backs’, and at their cost: as far as still alive, not maimed or homeless, they’re going to be reduced to powerless bystanders. They’re going to lose.
Now, of course, whoever only wants can go on doing that: feel free to continue declaring me ‘hysteric’, but all of this is a simple matter of fact. I’m merely drawing obvious conclusions.
Oh, you don’t like these conclusions?
There’s an easy solution: stop reading this blog. The internet is full of places with lots of fire and smoke, and endless sweet-talking.
This text is published with the permission of the author. First published here.
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